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LIMITED CHOICES: HOW THE SCHOOL-CHOICE PARADIGM 
SUBVERTS EQUAL EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS 
WITH DISABILITIES 
AMANDA S. SEN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 While there is no absolute right to education in the Constitution 
of the United States, legislation and litigation have created and 
elucidated specific rights of children to, at a minimum, equal op-
portunity in education.  For students with disabilities, the right to 
equality in educational opportunity can be found in both federal 
statutes and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.  
Rapidly developing education policy currently promotes increas-
ing options for parents to use federal and state funds to send their 
children to schools other than their neighborhood public schools 
(“school choice”).  However, the specific rights of students with 
disabilities have been largely overlooked.  This Article will explain 
the ways in which school-choice laws and the rights of students 
with disabilities overlap and interact, expose gaps that leave stu-
dents with disabilities vulnerable, and suggest actions that legisla-
tors and litigators can take to mitigate that vulnerability and en-
sure equal opportunity in education. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a private school in East Harlem, New York City that charges 
no tuition.  Admission to students in pre-kindergarten through eighth grade 
is ostensibly by lottery; though, as with most school lotteries, priorities like 
sibling attendance are in place.  The mission of this school, Storefront Acad-
emy, is: 
[T]o provide children of varied academic strengths quality educa-
tional opportunities, preparing them academically, socially and 
emotionally to become critical thinkers, high-achieving students 
and well-rounded individuals.  Working in partnership with fami-
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lies and community members, Storefront Academy instills a pow-
erful sense of self, and gives its students the tools to own the future 
and create meaningful adult lives.1 
Storefront Academy serves students of varied academic strengths, from 
students with learning disabilities to very gifted students, and its students ap-
pear to succeed.  Though an overwhelming majority of students come from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, ninety-five percent of graduating 
eighth graders go on to graduate from high school in a city in which about 
seventy percent of students graduate from high school.2  The school itself has 
grown and expanded into a second site, this one funded as a charter school.3 
Broadly, “school choice” refers to any scenario in which a parent can 
select a school for their child rather than simply being assigned to a public 
school, and Storefront Academy is a school choice success story.  Indeed, the 
current principal of Storefront Academy Harlem states in her biography that 
she is “a proud supporter of school choice and education reform.”4 
But, while Storefront Academy serves many students well, it is also em-
blematic of the limitations of school choice.  The school has small classes 
and dedicated teaching assistants in each elementary school classroom, bring-
ing the student-to-teacher ratios for both general education and special edu-
cation students down to incomparable lows.5  Those low student-to-teacher 
ratios—undoubtedly a key factor in the school’s success—are funded with 
private money and are simply not replicable under most public-school fund-
ing constraints.6  And yet, even with unusually low student-to-teacher ratios, 
Storefront Academy does not typically serve students who have needs greater 
than mild learning disabilities or mild speech and language disorders.  Only 
twelve percent of the student body has an Individualized Education Program 
                                                          
 1.  About Us, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 
18, 2018) (emphasis added).  
 2.  Results, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/results (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018); Elizabeth A. Harris, Graduation Rate Made Little Progress, State Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/nyregion/graduation-rate-new-york.html. 
 3.  History, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/history (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018).  The first Storefront school was founded as a non-profit and continues to be funded primarily 
by private grants, but also by federal and local government programs specifically designated for 
education, such as school lunch and pre-kindergarten.  See FAQs, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://store-
frontacademy.org/faqs (last visited Nov. 16, 2018); see also Partners & Supporters, STOREFRONT 
ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/partners-supporters (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 4.  Leadership, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/leadership (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2018).  
 5.  Our Model, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/our-model (last visited Jan. 
1, 2019).  In a New York City public school, the class size for elementary school classes can be, 
and often is, thirty-two students with one teacher.  What Are the Class Size Limits for My Grade?, 
UNITED FED’N OF TEACHERS, http://www.uft.org/faqs/what-are-class-size-limits-my-grade (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2019).  At the Storefront, classes in the lower school were capped at twenty and had 
both a lead teacher and an assistant teacher.  Our Model, supra. 
 6.  See supra note 3. 
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(“IEP”)7 as compared to seventeen percent of New York City public-school 
students.8  The school “counsels out” students with intellectual disabilities 
and emotional or behavioral disorders, telling parents their child’s needs can-
not be met at the school and they should seek a different educational envi-
ronment.9 
Are there parents who are thrilled that their child lucked into a seat at 
the Storefront Academy?  Absolutely.  For those parents, this is school choice 
at its finest.  But a parent whose first grader has been asked to leave the school 
because his sensory needs require interventions that the school will not pay 
for does not have this kind of school choice.  On a small scale, when there 
are viable public-education options available, this might seem like a small 
price to pay to optimize the educational options of other students, many of 
whom also face disadvantages such as poverty.  But on a larger scale, as 
school-choice programs gain increasing traction and have begun to dominate 
entire school districts, including New Orleans and Washington, D.C., there 
is a need to protect the educational rights of the most vulnerable students.  
This is particularly true as funders and advocates push for increasingly broad 
school-choice policies, causing supporters of public schools to fear that fund-
ing and regulatory protections for public schools will disappear in some cities 
and states.10 
Advocates for school choice, including parents, scholars, and politi-
cians, come from many backgrounds.  Some, like those who pushed for 
vouchers—public funding for the tuition for individual children to attend pri-
vate schools instead of local public schools—in Milwaukee, put in place in 
1990, are low-income, predominately black parents frustrated with the sub-
optimal education available to their children in public schools.11  Scholars 
and educators who are proponents of school choice see school choice as an 
                                                          
 7.  Results, supra note 2. 
 8.  ROBIN LAKE ET AL., CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL 
EDUCATION ENROLLMENT ANALYSIS 8 (2012), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537477.pdf. 
 9.  As a “learning specialist” at Storefront Academy (then The Children’s Storefront) from 
2006 to 2009, I worked with parents, teachers, and administrators to make educational decisions.  
In addition, I participated in meetings regarding students whom administrators and teachers sin-
cerely believed the school did not have the capacity to appropriately educate, particularly students 
with intellectual disabilities.  Many more students never even had the opportunity to apply.  As the 
current principal said about her view of the Storefront before joining it, “It was almost like a hidden 
secret.  No one kind of knew how you get in, what happens there, but there was this expectation that 
the kids did great things when they left.”  Dartunorro Clark, There’s a ‘Secret Sauce’ to Learning 
at Harlem’s Storefront Academy, DNAINFO (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20170402/east-harlem/alexis-thomas-storefront-academy. 
 10.  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Billionaires v Teachers: The Koch Brothers’ Plan to Starve 
Public Education, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/sep/07/arizona-fight-koch-brothers-school-vouchers. 
 11.  E.g., DANIEL MCGROARTY, TRINNIETTA GETS A CHANCE: SIX FAMILIES AND THEIR 
SCHOOL CHOICE EXPERIENCE 7–8 (2001). 
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opportunity to expand educational options and encourage innovations.12  An-
other set of advocates of school choice, including the current Secretary of 
Education, Betsy DeVos, have philosophical and economic objections to the 
dominance of public education in the United States and may even seek to see 
public education replaced altogether.13 
Critics of school choice contend that school choice policies take re-
sources from public schools and distract policy makers from more effective 
solutions, such as addressing the underlying poverty facing students in many 
struggling public schools.14  Critics also point to the white supremacist his-
tory of school choice as a tool to avoid court-ordered integration of public 
schools,15 evidence that school-choice policies intensify racial segregation,16 
                                                          
 12.  E.g., DAVID OSBORNE, REINVENTING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 35–43, 84–88 (2017). 
 13.  E.g., NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS 45–74, 207–34 (2017) (describing indi-
viduals and funds seeking to undermine public school systems in the United States); Kristina Rizga, 
Betsy DeVos Wants to Use America’s Schools to Build “God’s Kingdom,” MOTHER JONES, Mar.–
Apr. 2017, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/betsy-devos-christian-schools-vouchers-
charter-education-secretary/.  
 14.  E.g., DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR 4–6 (2013); MERCEDES K. SCHNEIDER, SCHOOL 
CHOICE: THE END OF PUBLIC EDUCATION? 79–84 (2016). 
 15.  See, e.g., Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of 
Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 362–63 (1997) (arguing that “[v]oucher proponents gener-
ally rely on a propagandized history of tuition vouchers that distorts the role of racial oppression in 
school privatization” and “the private school tuition voucher movement, in the context of its history 
and assumptions, demonstrably coincides with the white conservative pursuit of dominance and 
privilege”).  
 16.  See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT 
EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 9–11 
(2010), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4r07q8kg (“[C]harters exacerbate already rampant Ameri-
can school segregation, particularly for black students.”); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: 
School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1114–17 (2014); Martha Minow, 
Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 
836–40 (2011).  Parents of all races prefer schools in which their children would not be a minority.  
Justine S. Hastings et al., Parental Preferences and School Competition: Evidence from a Public 
School Choice Program 28 (Yale Econ. Applications & Policy, Discussion Paper No. 10, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=885537 (“[T]he average preferred school for each racial group was one in 
which [seventy percent] of the school was their own race.”).  White parents, in particular, are reluc-
tant to send their children to schools with large numbers of black children and use race as a proxy 
for determining quality.  Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (“[P]arents used the internet resource to 
reject schools having a significant majority of black students before they focused on other indicators 
of school quality . . . [and] race is closely related to parental perceptions of school quality. . . .  [A]n 
increase of more than two percent in the African-American population of a student body correlated 
with a perception that the school’s quality had declined even when the objective criteria contradicted 
that perception.”).  In North Carolina, charter schools are increasingly white as compared to district 
schools.  Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional Limits, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1401 (2018).  
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and the problematic ways that school-choice programs, which tend to be lo-
cated in low-income urban areas, generate private income for individuals and 
private corporations.17 
School choice can be beneficial to many individual children.  Parents 
are generally happy with “choice schools,” charter schools and private 
schools funded by state vouchers that parents select themselves but that are 
paid for with state funds.18  When faced with difficult problems in public 
education, many educators and parents turn to school choice as a solution for 
the children in front of them.  Most people placing their children in choice 
schools, running choice schools, or teaching within them can generally be 
said to be acting in reasonable, rational, and sympathetic ways.19 
That being said, public education guarantees much more than the ability 
of each parent to select the appropriate education for his or her individual 
child.20  The United States Constitution and many state constitutions require 
equitable public education,21 something school choice undermines by pro-
moting increasingly separate and unequal educational spaces.  Scholarship 
on school choice has identified ways in which school-choice policies create 
                                                          
 17.  See, e.g., SAMUEL E. ABRAMS, EDUCATION AND THE COMMERCIAL MINDSET 9–11, 192–
95 (2016) (detailing the history of for-profit educational management organizations); RAVITCH, su-
pra note 14, at 167–73 (describing ways that even non-profit charters schools generate income for 
for-profit companies); NOLIWE ROOKS, CUTTING SCHOOL: PRIVATIZATION, SEGREGATION, AND 
THE END OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 163–83 (2017) (describing ways in which charter and other par-
ticipants in school choice profit legally and illegally from school choice in urban areas, negatively 
impacting those communities). 
 18.  See, e.g., JAY P. GREENE & GREG FORSTER, VOUCHERS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION 
STUDENTS: AN EVALUATION OF FLORIDA’S MCKAY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 1, 15 (2003), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_38.pdf (describing satisfaction of parents who partici-
pate in the McKay Scholarship program as high, though only sixty-two percent of former partici-
pants were happy with their choice school).  I use “choice schools” to describe charter schools and 
private schools to which parents affirmatively choose to enroll their children and that receive public 
funding of one type or another.  Parents are also generally happy with neighborhood public schools.  
DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 16 n.88.  Data over several decades indicate that students in neighbor-
hood public schools and choice schools alike have mixed educational attainment, with no particular 
advantage to students in charter or voucher schools.  MARTIN CARNOY, SCHOOL VOUCHERS ARE 
NOT A PROVEN STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 1, 3–7, 10 (2017), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/school-vouchers-are-not-a-proven-strategy-for-improving-student-
achievement/; CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 1–6 (2009). 
 19.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Reality over Ideology: A Practical View of Special 
Needs Voucher Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 53, 77 (2014) (describing parents’ reasonable deci-
sions to move their own children with special education needs to private school).  See generally 
MCGROARTY, supra note 11 (describing the positive experiences of several families utilizing school 
choice).  
 20.  Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 445, 447 (2013) (“Public education entails the provision of common experiences under con-
ditions consistent with equal protection, due process, free speech, and religious neutrality.  A con-
sumer-based system allows for too much educational variation and opens the door to individual 
biases that are contrary to public education.”). 
 21.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Black, supra note 16, at 1359, 1403. 
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tension between, on the one hand, parental interests in choosing the best pub-
licly-funded educational options for their own children, and on the other, 
public goals and constitutional requirements of equal treatment.  Professor 
Martha Minow of Harvard Law School identified ways in which the rhetoric 
of school choice both promotes values of equality and liberty and serves to 
“channel[]—or paper[] over—deep conflicts over religion, race, immigra-
tion, [and] national identity.”22  Most recently, Professor Derek W. Black 
identified ways in which school choice “stratif[ies] opportunity,” “inten-
sif[ies] segregation,” and violates state constitutions that mandate that public 
education be a “first-order right.”23 
Most school-choice advocates emphasize that they are advocating for 
all students to have access to high-quality education.  The Center for Educa-
tion Reform, which advocates for school choice, states, “[O]ur [m]ission [is] 
[t]o expand educational opportunities that lead to improved economic out-
comes for all Americans, particularly our youth, ensuring that the conditions 
are ripe for innovation, freedom and flexibility throughout U.S. education.”24  
The American Federation for Children Growth Fund, a national organization 
that advocates for vouchers, state-funded scholarships to private schools, and 
tax-credit programs to pay for private-school educations, describes its mis-
sion as, “To improve our nation’s K-12 education by advancing systemic and 
sustainable public policy that empowers parents, particularly those in low-
income families, to choose the education they determine is best for their chil-
dren.”25 
But, as noted above, and as will be shown in this Article, adequate op-
tions prove to be elusive for many students in choice systems.  Rather than 
increasing educational opportunity, broad school-choice programs can leave 
students with inadequate educational opportunities.  This is especially true 
for children with disabilities.  Ultimately, school choice sets the rights and 
interests of some parents against the rights and interests of other parents in 
ways that our current legal framework does not adequately address.  Students 
with disabilities, ostensibly protected by bipartisan-supported federal law,26 
are left to bear the brunt of this shortcoming. 
This Article will address the rights of students with disabilities in light 
of the ever-increasing movement towards greater school choice and suggests 
                                                          
 22.  Minow, supra note 16, at 816. 
 23.  Black, supra note 16, at 1359. 
 24.  About, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 26, 
2017). 
 25.  About Us, AM. FED’N FOR CHILDREN GROWTH FUND, https://afcgrowthfund.org/about-us/ 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2017) (emphasis omitted). 
 26.  See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1421 (2012); Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).   
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ways in which attorneys and policy makers should address the inequalities 
that increase for students with disabilities within choice systems.  The Article 
will focus on state-funded school-choice programs, particularly charter 
schools and voucher schemes.  While there is now considerable data and in-
formation available about such programs, there is still relatively little legal 
scholarship on the subject, particularly with regards to students with disabil-
ities and federal laws that protect those students, such as the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).27  Scholars have identified the prob-
lems of “skimming”—the almost inevitable fact of choice schools excluding 
children with challenging learning needs and serving higher achieving chil-
dren than their public-school counterparts.28  In this process, students with 
disabilities are left out and left behind.  Despite this, scholarship addressing 
the rights of students with disabilities and the ways in which those rights in-
teract with school-choice laws and realities is limited. 
The legal rights of students with disabilities are intertwined with and 
overlap with the rights of racial minorities.  This is in part because minority 
students are over identified as having disabilities as compared to their white 
peers,29 but primarily because federal and state constitutional principles of 
equality protect both racial minorities and students with disabilities.30  For 
students with disabilities, those protections are defined through comprehen-
sive federal and state laws supported by politicians from both major parties.31  
                                                          
 27.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).  Current, informative scholarship on private school 
voucher programs includes a focus on Milwaukee’s voucher program and the lawsuits that have 
challenged that program.  Compare Wendy F. Hensel, The Limits of Federal Disability Law: State 
Educational Voucher Programs, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 199, 200–05 (2015), with Stephen A. Rosenbaum, 
Preserving Public Values in the Private Sector: Unintended Consequences or Vouching for Able-
ism-Free Schools?, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 369, 373–81 (2016).  See generally Julie F. Mead, Private in 
Name Only: A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis of Milwaukee’s Private School Voucher Pro-
gram, 21 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 331 (2015). 
 28.  See, e.g., Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional 
Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2006–09 (1996) (identifying policies 
that lead to skimming).  
 29.  See, e.g., Ama Mazama & Garvey Lundy, African American Homeschooling as Racial 
Protectionism, 43 J. BLACK STUD. 723, 727–28 (2012) (“African American students are more than 
twice as likely to be labeled ‘mentally retarded’ as European American students, and although they 
make up only [seventeen percent] of the student population, they nonetheless represent [thirty-three 
percent] of those enrolled in programs for children with mental retardation.” (citations omitted)); 
John McKenna, The Disproportionate Representation of African Americans in Programs for Stu-
dents with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 57 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE 206, 206 (2013) 
(“African American students are disproportionally represented in educational programs for students 
meeting eligibility criteria for emotional disturbance.”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Betty Y. Ashbaker, History of Legal and Legislative Acts Concerned with Special 
Education, in HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 21, 21–45 (Anthony F. Rotatori et al. eds., 2011); 
Steven L. Nelson, Special Education Reform Policies and the Permanence of Oppression: A Critical 
Race Case Study of Special Education Reform in Shelby County, Tennessee, 60 HOW. L.J. 459, 461–
62 (2017). 
 31.  See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, H.R. 1350, 108th 
Cong. (showing that the law passed with overwhelming majorities in both the U.S.  Senate and the 
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Specifically, tailored legislation and regulation could possibly allow the pos-
itive goals of school choice—innovation and parental freedom to choose—to 
flourish, while inhibiting negative outcomes like racial segregation and mar-
ginalization of students with disabilities. 
Addressing shortcomings in school-choice policies is more important 
than ever given the current momentum towards increasing school-choice pro-
grams.  Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court create an envi-
ronment more favorable than ever to school choice by affirming the legiti-
macy of funding schemes that direct public money to private and parochial 
schools.32  Politically and financially influential interest groups and individ-
uals, such as Jeb Bush, Betsy DeVos, the Walton Family Foundation, and the 
Goldwater Institute, are heavily invested in promoting school choice.33  The 
federal government also supports school choice.  For example, former Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s administration implemented “Race to the Top,” a fund 
providing grants to states implementing specific reforms, such as improving 
assessments and data systems.34  This fund promoted the creation of charter 
schools, which are schools established according to state law and funded by 
the state.35  Furthermore, Betsy DeVos is a self-proclaimed advocate of 
school choice, including vouchers.36  Particularly at a time when policy mak-
ers at the federal level are led by people who would like to see the traditional 
                                                          
House of Representatives); see also Roll Call Vote 108th Congress-2nd Session, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legisla-
tive/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session=2&vote=00094 (last vis-
ited Jan. 9, 2019); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 154, OFF. CLERK U.S. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll154.xml (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).  
 32.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–25 (2017) 
(requiring that a state allow religious entities to compete for grants of public money alongside sec-
ular organizations); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–52 (2002) (determining that 
public funds could be used to pay for religious education as long as parents directed the money 
through the use of vouchers); see also Emma Brown, Why Betsy DeVos Is Cheering the Supreme 
Court’s Church Playground Decision, WASH. POST (June 27, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/06/26/why-betsy-devos-is-cheering-the-supreme-courts-
church-playground-decision/?utm_term=.9b662dcb6f4d (“Voucher advocates said that line of rea-
soning opens the way for the high court to rule in favor of allowing public funds to flow to parochial 
schools.”). 
 33.  RAVITCH, supra note 14, at 22–23; ROOKS, supra note 17, at 154–59; SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 14, at 69–78. 
 34.  Race to the Top, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/ed-
ucation/k-12/race-to-the-top (last visited Feb. 15, 2019); SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 65–66. 
 35.  See, e.g., Katrina E. Bulkley, Charter Schools . . . Taking a Closer Look, 77 EDUC. DIG. 
58, 58 (2012) (“[T]he Obama administration has highlighted charter schools under its Race to the 
Top fund and in regulations for its School Improvement Grant program.”).  Charter schools are 
“public” schools but are run independently from and with greater freedom than traditional public 
schools.  Id. 
 36.  Chris Weller, New Education Secretary Betsy DeVos Champions Vouchers and Charter 
Schools—Here’s What That Means, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/what-are-charter-schools-2017-2.  
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local-public-school model of public education replaced by choice systems,37 
it is important to understand the threat to the rights of special-education stu-
dents created by broad school-choice policies and to mitigate that threat. 
Part I of this Article will address the origins and history of school-choice 
policies.  A major goal of school-choice policies is to limit the hand of gov-
ernment, giving more freedom to educators and parents.  At key moments, 
however, school-choice policies have also deliberately or inadvertently ex-
acerbated inequalities antithetical to well-established principles of law and 
public policy.  Knowing how this has happened provides us with a better 
understanding of the importance of guarding those principles.  Part II will 
provide a brief history and overview of federal law protecting students with 
disabilities, the IDEA; will introduce the legal requirement that students be 
educated in their “least restrictive environment” (“LRE”); and will explain 
the ways in which the funding structure of the IDEA is built around the struc-
ture of traditional public schools.  Part III will discuss the interaction between 
the IDEA and school choice, describing the ways that current school choice 
laws and policies violate the spirit and letter of the IDEA and the constitu-
tional principle of equal protection under the law.  Part IV will elucidate the 
competing interests and rights underlying debates about school choice.  Fi-
nally, Part V will suggest ways in which attorneys can utilize the IDEA, and 
the constitutional requirements underlying it, to insist on equal protection for 
students with disabilities in school choice programs. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCHOOL CHOICE 
A.  Early School Choice 
As public schools and compulsory attendance laws developed in the 
early twentieth century in the United States,38 parents and private schools 
challenged laws mandating that all children attend public schools.  In 1925, 
the Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,39 agreed that children 
should not be required to attend public school to the exclusion of private or 
religious schooling and established the principle that parents have a constitu-
tional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children absent a 
compelling state reason to the contrary.40  This decision did not, however, 
                                                          
 37.  Valerie Strauss, DeVos: Picking a School Should Be Like Choosing Among Uber, Lyft or 
a Taxi, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2017/03/29/devos-picking-a-school-should-be-like-choosing-among-uber-lyft-or-a-
taxi/?utm_term=.ae2b1c905bda. 
 38.  DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 
15–39, 66–68 (1974).  
 39.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 40.  Id. at 534–35 (“[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
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open the door to public funding of private and parochial schools.  Public 
funding remained limited to public schools.41 
The push to fund private education with state money came several dec-
ades after Pierce, following the landmark 1954 Supreme Court case, Brown 
v. Board of Education.42  In Brown, the Court held that racially segregated 
schools were inherently unequal and violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.43  This decision set off dec-
ades of federal court monitoring of state and local efforts to desegregate or 
avoid desegregating their schools.44 
The year after Brown, Milton Friedman, an economist at the University 
of Chicago, known for his advocacy of free-market capitalism and widely 
considered the “father of school choice,” began writing on the issue.45  In a 
1955 essay, he theorized that government was overly involved in education 
and proposed an early version of vouchers: A system of state-funded subsi-
dies that parents could use to fund a school of their choice, including paro-
chial schools.46  Friedman theorized, “The adoption of such arrangements 
would make for more effective competition among various types of schools 
and for a more efficient utilization of their resources.”47 
It was not long before southern states, seeking to avoid racial integration 
of public schools following Brown, began using the rhetoric and ideas for 
school choice in the United States more broadly.  In the 1950s and 1960s, 
states including Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana passed 
legislation and amended state constitutions to allow or even force school dis-
tricts to close in the face of court orders to desegregate.48  They authorized 
vouchers to fund racially segregated private schools.49  The language of 
choice was common in state efforts to prevent full desegregation.  South Car-
olina’s act began with a broad statement of choice: 
                                                          
their control.  As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be 
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of 
the State.  The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept in-
struction from public teachers only.  The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations.”).   
 41.  Minow, supra note 16, at 819–20. 
 42.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 43.  Id. at 495. 
 44.  GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION xxi–xxiii (1996) (listing signifi-
cant federal court cases regarding desegregation orders). 
 45.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 27–29. 
 46.  Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). 
 47.  Id. at 134. 
 48.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 16–25. 
 49.  Id.; Minow, supra note 16, at 821–24. 
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The General Assembly finds that the cause of primary and second-
ary education in South Carolina will be advanced if individual chil-
dren of school age, their parents and guardians, are made free to 
choose between public and private educational institutions.  Pro-
vision has been made for the transfer of pupils from one public 
school to another, subject to such limitations as may be necessi-
tated by local conditions, and it is considered highly desirable that 
the freedom to choose among available educational institutions be 
extended and enlarged by providing scholarship grants for children 
entitled to attend primary and secondary public schools who wish 
to attend private or independent institutions, such scholarship 
grants to be furnished from State funds supplemented by local 
school districts.50 
These voucher laws did not last long.  State and federal courts, including 
the Supreme Court, declared the actions of states that closed public schools 
in favor of vouchers for private schools unconstitutional insofar as they were 
designed primarily to maintain segregated schools.51  The Supreme Court 
held that closing some public schools and requiring that students go to seg-
regated private schools with state funding denied these children equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.52  The United 
States District Court for the District of South Carolina saw through the lan-
guage of choice in South Carolina’s act and determined that the clear moti-
vation behind the act was to avoid desegregation.  The court held: 
A review of the record, including the historical background of the 
Act, clearly reveals that the purpose, motive and effect of the Act 
is to unconstitutionally circumvent the requirement . . . that the 
                                                          
 50.  Brown v. S.C. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199, 200 n.1 (D.S.C. 1968) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 1963 S.C. Acts 498–500). 
 51.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (“Whatever nonracial grounds 
might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitu-
tional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”); 
Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. La. 1961) (finding a Louisiana act 
tasking “the school board of the parish where the public schools have been ‘closed’ . . . with respon-
sibility for furnishing free lunches, transportation, and grants-in-aid to . . . children attending . . . 
‘private’ schools” to be “a transparent artifice designed to deny the plaintiffs their declared consti-
tutional right to attend desegregated public schools”); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 338 
(E.D. Va. 1959) (“[N]o one public school or grade in the county or city may be closed to avoid the 
effect of the law of the land while other public schools or grades remain open at the expense of the 
taxpayers.”); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959) (holding that the Virginia constitution 
required the state to maintain public schools but allowed the state to make tuition grants to private 
schools).  
 52.  Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230–31. 
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State of South Carolina not discriminate on the basis of race or 
color in its public educational system.53 
Voucher programs withered following these decisions.54 
B.  School Choice Moves into the Mainstream 
The charter-school movement propelled school choice into the main-
stream in the 1990s.  Developed in the 1980s primarily by Ray Budde, a pro-
fessor of education at the University of Massachusetts, and then American 
Federation of Teachers President Albert Shanker, the original concept of 
charter schools envisioned teacher-designed and run schools that would have 
freedom to innovate.55  In Budde and Shanker’s conception of charter 
schools, parents would have the option to send or not send their children to 
these experimental, teacher-run schools, thus “empower[ing] both teachers 
and parents.”56  As in Friedman’s proposal for a voucher system, the goal 
was to foster innovation by reducing government oversight.  Shanker also 
supported giving parents the ability to “shop around” amongst public 
schools.57 
The first state charter-school law was passed in Minnesota in 1991, and 
the first charter school opened there in the 1992 to 1993 school year.58  Char-
ter-school laws were quickly passed in other states, including California, 
New York, Colorado, and Michigan.59  Conceptually, charter schools were 
viewed as healthy competition to local schools, enrolling students from 
                                                          
 53.  Brown, 296 F. Supp. at 202–03.  Later, some school boards also attempted to use choice as 
the primary means of desegregating their schools, a mechanism that proved ineffective at best and 
disingenuous at worst.  Minow, supra note 16, at 824–29.  The Supreme Court noted that a Virginia 
“freedom of choice” plan, which a defendant school board claimed was an effort to desegregate 
rather than maintain segregation, had not been shown to be effective and held that “if there are 
reasonably available other ways, such . . . as zoning, . . . ‘freedom of choice’ must be held unac-
ceptable.”  Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–42 (1968).  The federal courts later also 
rejected magnet programs as a tool of integration.  See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) 
(reversing a district court decision ordering a comprehensive magnet program to address segrega-
tion between city and suburban schools in the Kansas City metropolitan area). 
 54.  A few states tried to use vouchers and magnet schools to desegregate their schools, but 
federal courts largely deemed those steps inadequate after an attempt to use a voucher program to 
meet desegregation requirements was struck down by the Supreme Court in Green.  See supra note 
53; see also Minow, supra note 16, at 824–29 (describing court actions). 
 55.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 46–52. 
 56.  Id. at 52, 60. 
 57.  William K. Stevens, Shanker Proposes Parents Be Allowed to Pick Child’s School, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 7, 1971), http://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/07/archives/shanker-proposes-parents-be-
allowed-to-pick-childs-school.html?_r=0. 
 58.  EILEEN M. AHEARN ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION AS REQUIREMENTS IN CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY 4 (2001), http://www.nasdse.org/Portals/0/Doc-
uments/ProjectSearch.pdf.  
 59.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 59–63. 
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across public school districts.60  Indeed, “[m]ost state charter-authorizing 
statutes specifically identify expanding choice options as a reason for creat-
ing charter schools.”61 
Despite the initial conception of the charter school as a sort of laboratory 
of innovative education, in practice, this has not been their most significant 
role. Charter schools are often used to replace public schools in reorganiza-
tions of struggling urban school districts.62  After Hurricane Katrina, New 
Orleans replaced its entire school district with a choice-based district, the 
“Recovery School District” (“RSD”).63  As will be discussed below, this kind 
of broad use of school choice is especially constraining for parents seeking 
integrated schools that will meet their children’s educational needs. Even in 
cities that are not replacing large numbers of public schools with charter 
schools, large organizations, like the Knowledge is Power Program (“KIPP”) 
and the for-profit Edison Project, have dominated charter-school develop-
ment,64 not local teachers. 
Vouchers and tuition tax credits have been used in recent decades to 
facilitate government funding of private schools.65  Tax credits allow parents 
to deduct tuition paid to private schools when they file their income taxes.66  
These tax credits benefit primarily upper-income families who pay signifi-
cant amounts of income tax and can afford to pay for private schools in the 
first place.67  Vouchers provide direct public funding to private schools by 
giving parents the option of directing a certain amount of public money for 
their child to go to a school of their choosing.  Objections to such funding 
                                                          
 60.  Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 655, 667 (2012).  
 61.  Id. (citing state statutes such as 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(b)(6), IND. CODE 
ANN. § 20-24-2-1(2), and N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2850(2)(e) (McKinney 2009)).  
 62.  Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District Act and 
New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 142–47, 155–57 (2007); see also ABRAMS, 
supra note 17, at 55–95 (describing the ultimately unsuccessful takeover of four Baltimore schools 
by a for-profit charter school enterprise, the Edison Project).  
 63.  Alice Huff, Re-forming the Post-Political City?, in ONLY IN NEW ORLEANS 87–102 (Luis 
Mirón et al. eds., 2015); see also OSBORNE, supra note 12, at 27–33 (describing the financial and 
physical destruction of the New Orleans public schools, which were already struggling financially 
and academically, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent process of turning the school 
district into the Recovery School District). 
 64.  See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 55–95.  KIPP’s students are almost entirely low-
income students of color in urban areas.  ROOKS, supra note 17, at 44. 
 65.  Matt Barnum, The Rise of Tax Credits: How Arizona Created an Alternative to School 
Vouchers—and Why They’re Spreading, CHALKBEAT (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.chalk-
beat.org/posts/us/2017/09/18/the-rise-of-tax-credits-how-arizona-created-an-alternative-to-school-
vouchers-and-why-theyre-spreading/. 
 66.  Isabel Chou, Comment, “Opportunity” for All?: How Tax Credit Scholarships will Fare 
in New Jersey, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 305 (2011). 
 67.  Mei-lan E. Wong, Note, The Implications of School Choice for Children with Disabilities, 
103 YALE L.J. 827, 833–34 (1993). 
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have not succeeded in the courts so long as the funding has been guided by 
parents’ individual choice rather than decided by the state.  In 2002, the Su-
preme Court opened the door to public funding for parochial schools, finding 
that voucher programs do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution as long as parents themselves select the 
schools to receive funding on their behalf, not the state.68 
Since 2002, voucher programs have grown in the United States with 
overwhelming legislative support. 69  As of 2014, fourteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have legislation authorizing voucher programs.70  That leg-
islation was overwhelmingly passed after 2002.  Charter schools have been 
growing alongside voucher programs.  Between 2000 and 2016, the number 
of charter schools nationwide increased from four percent to seven percent 
of all public schools.71  As the number of charter schools grew, so did their 
student bodies, as evidenced by increases in the number of charter schools 
with large numbers of students.72 
In sum, school choice has a lengthy history as a tool through which in-
terest groups with many different goals seek to shape public education.  
School boards unsuccessfully attempted to use school choice to avoid court-
ordered desegregation.  Parents have sought the right to educate their children 
religiously, at first simply as a right to opt out of public education and more 
recently as a right to use public funds for parochial schools.  Charter schools 
have been used to restructure large swaths of public-school districts.  All of 
these uses of school choice intersect with and impact the application of laws 
designed to protect students with disabilities, which will be discussed be-
low.73 
                                                          
 68.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–52 (2002) (“[W]here a government aid 
program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citi-
zens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine 
and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establish-
ment Clause.” (first citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); then citing Witters v. Wash. Dep’t 
of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); and then citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 
509 U.S. 1 (1993)). 
 69.  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL VOUCHER LAWS: STATE-BY-
STATE COMPARISON (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/StateByStateVoucherCompari-
son.pdf.  Two states, Maine and Vermont, have long-standing voucher programs that provide vouch-
ers only to students who live in a town without a public school.  Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71.  Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2018).  
 72.  Id.  
 73.  See supra Part III. 
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II.  IDEA HISTORY AND GOALS 
A.  History and Public Policy Rationale for the Principle of “Least 
Restrictive Environment” in Special Education Law 
As public schools became common in the nineteenth century, students 
with special needs, including cognitive disabilities, vision impairments and 
severe health problems, were educated in separate settings from their general-
education peers.74  Many children with disabilities were entirely excluded 
from public schools.75  Those who did attend public schools often did not 
receive adequate instruction, as many public schools lacked sufficient re-
sources.76  In the first half of the twentieth century, most educators espoused 
segregated education for students with special needs.77  It wasn’t until the 
1940s that educators began to recognize the merits of integrating students 
with disabilities with mainstream students.78  Nevertheless, the education of 
students with disabilities remained primarily institution based through the 
1950s and into the 1960s.79  During this time, national organizations, such as 
the National Association of the Deaf, the National Association for Retarded 
Children and the Council for Exceptional Children, pushed to change both 
laws and public perception of people with disabilities.80 
Brown v. Board of Education, which ordered racial integration of public 
schools, also prompted significant movement in federal law regarding the 
education of children with disabilities on the principle of equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.81  Following the Su-
preme Court decision in Brown, federal courts articulated constitutional re-
quirements for equal protection under the law for children with disabilities.  
In 1972, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered 
that children with special needs had to be “provided with a publicly-sup-
ported education[]” and that state boards of education had a “clear duty to 
include and retain these children in the public school system.”82  Also in 
1972, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
enforced a consent agreement that required that children with disabilities 
have access to the same free, public education as provided to other children.83 
                                                          
 74.  ROBERT L. OSGOOD, THE HISTORY OF INCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES 22–33 (2005). 
 75.  See, e.g., DEBORAH N. ARCHER & RICHARD D. MARSICO, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 3 (2017).  
 76.  20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2012). 
 77.  OSGOOD, supra note 74, at 25–31, 43. 
 78.  Id. at 43–54. 
 79.  Id. at 54–57. 
 80.  Id. at 56–72. 
 81.  Ashbaker, supra note 30, at 21–45; Nelson, supra note 30, at 460–61.  
 82.  Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876, 880 (D.D.C. 1972).  
 83.  Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).  
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Shortly after these decisions, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973,84 of which Section 504 bans discrimination on the basis of disability 
by recipients of federal funding, including schools.85  This was quickly fol-
lowed by the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(“EAHCA”)86 in 1975, which emphasized a congressional preference for 
teaching students with disabilities in a mainstream classroom.87  These laws 
were enacted before any decision was made by the Supreme Court on the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as pertaining to students with disabilities. 
The clearly articulated federal preference for “mainstreaming”88 contin-
ues today.89  The IDEA, the successor of the EAHCA, states: “Almost [thirty] 
years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of chil-
dren with disabilities can be made more effective by . . . having high expec-
tations for such children and ensuring their access to the general education 
curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent possible.”90 
The preference for mainstreaming students with disabilities is also rec-
ognized internationally.  In 1994, representatives of ninety-two countries met 
under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) and created the Salamanca Statement, saying, 
among other things, 
[T]hose with special educational needs must have access to regular 
schools which should accommodate them within a childcentered 
pedagogy capable of meeting these needs, [and] regular schools 
with this inclusive orientation are the most effective means of com-
bating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, 
building an inclusive society and achieving education for all; more-
                                                          
 84.  Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.). 
 85.  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); Wong, supra note 67, at 838. 
 86.  Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amended 1990). 
 87.  See Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: 
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for 
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 425 (2001) (“[S]pecial classes, separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular education environment 
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular 
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1994))). 
 88.  “Mainstreaming” is a term for integrating special education students into general education 
classrooms and providing educational support in that environment as much as possible.  What Does 
Mainstreaming Mean?, MASTERS IN SPECIAL EDUC., https://www.masters-in-special-educa-
tion.com/faq/what-does-mainstreaming-mean/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).  
 89.  Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. 
L. REV. 1237, 1239–41 (1995); Losen & Welner, supra note 87, at 425.  
 90.  20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (2012). 
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over, they provide an effective education to the majority of chil-
dren and improve the efficiency and ultimately the cost-effective-
ness of the entire education system.91 
Countries worldwide are increasingly moving towards these ideals in prac-
tice.92 
B.  Current Law 
Federal law, primarily the IDEA, governs special education.93  All states 
have enacted statutes that conform with the IDEA.94  The Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”)95 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 96 also 
provide protections for students with disabilities.  Unlike the IDEA, which 
applies only to public schools, Section 504 applies to all schools that receive 
federal funds.97  Similarly, the ADA applies to all places of education that 
affect commerce,98 though “religious organizations or entities controlled by 
religious organizations” are exempted.99 
The IDEA, however, provides far more protections for students with 
disabilities than the ADA or Section 504.100  The core requirement of the 
IDEA is that states must provide all students with disabilities a free, appro-
priate public education (“FAPE”).101  To provide a FAPE, a public school 
must create and implement educational programs designed for a student to 
                                                          
 91.  World Conference on Special Needs Education: Access and Quality, The Salamanca State-
ment and Framework for Action on Special Needs Education, viii–ix, U.N. Doc. ED-94/WS/18 
(June 7–10, 1994). 
 92.  Nienke M. Ruijs & Thea T.D. Peetsma, Effects of Inclusion on Students with and Without 
Special Educational Needs Reviewed, 4 EDUC. RES. REV. 67, 67–68 (2009).  
 93.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482. 
 94.  Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule 
for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1091–92 (2010).  The IDEA is rooted in 
federal constitutional requirements for equal protection and due process.  Id. at 1092; see also 20 
U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6) (“While States, local educational agencies, and educational service agencies 
are primarily responsible for providing an education for all children with disabilities, it is in the 
national interest that the Federal Government have a supporting role in assisting State and local 
efforts to educate children with disabilities in order to improve results for such children and to en-
sure equal protection of the law.”). 
 95.  Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 96.  29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 794 (2012).  
 97.  Id. § 794. 
 98.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).  
 99.  Id. § 12187. 
 100.  The ADA and Section 504 are primarily anti-discrimination laws, while the IDEA provides 
affirmative and funded mandates to provide appropriate education to special education students.  20 
U.S.C. § 1412 (2012). 
 101.  Id. § 1412(a)(1). 
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make appropriate progress that is “merely more than de minimis.”102   One of 
the central features of the IDEA is the requirement that students with disabil-
ities be educated in their LRE.  This means that they should be educated with 
general education peers as much as possible, only being removed when ab-
solutely necessary for the students to make progress.103 
Inclusive special education is far from perfect in the United States.  
Stigma attached to students identified as having disabilities results in lowered 
teacher expectations and can possibly account for lower academic perfor-
mance.104  Parents, who are generally more concerned about stigmatization 
and segregation of their children than are educators, often resist defining their 
children through the label of disability.105  Educators, on the other hand, tend 
to see disability labels as useful tools for identifying educational needs.106  
This can slip into a preference for removing students with disabilities from 
the general education classroom.  As a 2015 study of implementation of the 
LRE mandate noted in the discussion: 
Teachers should . . . be aware of the over-reliance on the use of 
separate environments for students as a mechanism to relieve their 
perceived student frustration. . . .  When special educators retreat 
into their separate habitats, they leave general education teachers 
without the resources and supports necessary to make their aca-
demic and social environments healthy for all students.107 
                                                          
 102.  Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000–01 (2017); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203–04 (1982).  
 103.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabili-
ties, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with 
children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children 
with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity 
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary 
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”). 
 104.  See, e.g., Dara Shifrer, Stigma of a Label: Educational Expectations for High School Stu-
dents Labeled with Learning Disabilities, 54 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 462 (2013) (describing 
lowered expectations for students carrying learning disability label).  Stigma and segregation also 
limit students’ social opportunities.  See, e.g., Priya Lalvani, Disability, Stigma and Otherness: Per-
spectives of Parents and Teachers, 62 INT’L J. DISABILITY, DEV. & EDUC. 379, 384–86 (2015). 
 105.  Lalvani, supra note 104, at 382–85 (discussing how parents of children with disabilities 
tend to position their children in terms of their similarities with other children).  
 106.  Id.  Educators often attribute parents’ insistence on maximizing their children’s opportuni-
ties as “denial” about their children’s disabilities.  Id. at 388–89; see also James M. Kauffman & 
Jeanmarie Badar, How We Might Make Special Education for Students with Emotional or Behav-
ioral Disorders Less Stigmatizing, 39 BEHAV. DISORDERS 16, 16, 18–22 (2013) (recommending 
using plain language to talk about differences, “accepting the reality” and recognizing value of spe-
cial educators’ skills to reduce “stigma”). 
 107.  Laura C. O’Laughlin, The Least Restrictive Environment Clause of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act and Institutional Ableism 126 (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Clemson University), https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_disserta-
tions/1114/?utm_source=tigerprints.clemson.edu%2Fall_dissertations%2F1114&utm_me-
dium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.  
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Parents whose children do not receive an appropriate special education 
in their LRE can bring a complaint through an administrative process.108  Par-
ents can ask an administrative hearing officer to order either a change in their 
child’s IEP,109 compensatory services (like tutoring to help a child catch up 
on what they theoretically would have learned had an appropriate education 
been provided), or tuition for a private school that meets the student’s 
needs.110  In order to obtain tuition to a private school, parents have to show 
that the private school is appropriate, although private schools are not subject 
to the same requirements as public schools and do not have to educate stu-
dents in their LRE.111 
C.  Explanation of Local Education Agencies and their Basic 
Obligations to Students with Special Needs 
Local Education Agencies (“LEAs”) are administrative agencies or 
other units that administer groups of public schools.112  LEAs are responsible 
for implementing federal special education requirements—for providing stu-
dents with disabilities with a FAPE—and are the units to which funding is 
distributed (through states) for such purposes.113  The most common LEAs 
are school districts.  When passing the EAHCA, the predecessor to the IDEA, 
in 1975, Congress recognized the importance of economies of scale.114  It 
required small school districts to form consolidated programs to comply with 
                                                          
 108.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2018); see also Perry A. Zirkel, The Re-
medial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (2006) (“The cornerstone for resolving disputes between par-
ents and districts as to eligibility, FAPE, and other issues under the IDEA, is an impartial adminis-
trative adjudication conducted by a hearing/review officer (H/RO).  The IDEA gives states the 
choice of having a one-tiered system, consisting solely of an impartial due process hearing, or a 
two-tiered system, which includes an additional officer level review.  Subsequent to exhausting this 
administrative adjudication, the aggrieved party has the right to judicial review in state or federal 
court.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 109.  An IEP is a plan that lays out, among other things, a student’s educational setting, services, 
and goals.  Under federal law, each IEP must be reconsidered and written anew annually by a team 
that includes the child’s parent and teacher.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B). 
 110.  Zirkel, supra note 108, at 408–16 (describing the authority of the hearing officer to order 
various types of injunctive relief). 
 111.  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).  
 112.  20 U.S.C. § 7801(26)(A) (defining LEAs as “public board of education or other public 
authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to 
perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, 
township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or of or for a combination of 
school districts or counties that is recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public 
elementary schools or secondary schools”).  
 113.  20 U.S.C. § 1413. 
 114.  Garda, supra note 60, at 671. 
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the EAHCA’s mandates.115  Larger LEAs are able to pool resources, for ex-
ample, by grouping students with particular needs together in a school with 
specialized teachers and services providers,116 which helps them allocate 
these resources to students more efficiently. 
These efficiencies all but disappear in the charter school realm.  Charter 
schools are established by state law.  They are fairly new to the U.S. educa-
tion system, having first been established in the 1990s.117  While federal laws 
regarding students with disabilities apply to charter schools,118 they are not 
necessarily designed to be compatible with these federal laws, leading one 
scholar to call charter schools the “square peg” in the “round hole” of special 
education.119  States handle the question of charter schools’ LEA status dif-
ferently.  Some states require charter schools to be part of a larger LEA, while 
others establish charter schools as their own LEA.120  Still others allow char-
ter schools to choose between being part of a larger LEA or being their own 
LEA.121  When a charter school is its own LEA, the charter school must pro-
vide services to students with disabilities itself.122  When part of a larger LEA, 
the LEA retains the responsibility of providing appropriate services to stu-
dents with disabilities.123  While the IDEA encourages states to require small 
LEAs that are not “of sufficient size and scope to effectively meet the needs 
of children with disabilities” to combine with other LEAs to provide adequate 
special education services to students, as of 1997, the IDEA excludes charter 
schools from this provision, saying that state educational agencies cannot re-
quire charter schools to combine with other LEAs unless “explicitly permit-
ted to do so under the State’s charter school law.”124 
                                                          
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See, e.g., id. at 703. 
 117.  AHEARN ET AL., supra note 58, at 4. 
 118.  34 C.F.R. § 300.209 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER THE 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/pol-
icy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/faq-idea-charter-school.pdf (providing guidance regarding 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq. and 34 C.F.R. Part 300). 
 119.  Garda, supra note 60, at 655–67.  
 120.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-543, CHARTER SCHOOLS: ADDITIONAL 
FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT ACCESS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 3–4 
(2012). 
 121.  Id.  In this report, the Government Accountability Office, in consultation with the Depart-
ment of Education, evaluated the under representation of students with disabilities in charter schools 
and concluded that action should be taken to encourage charter schools to better serve students with 
disabilities.  Id. at 21–22. 
 122.  Id. at 3–4. 
 123.  Id. at 4. 
 124.  20 U.S.C. § 1413(e)(1) (2012).  The IDEA states:  
  A State educational agency may require a local educational agency to establish its 
eligibility jointly with another local educational agency if the State educational agency 
determines that the local educational agency will be ineligible under this section because 
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Unlike charter schools, private and parochial schools are not themselves 
regulated under the IDEA and are under no obligation to provide students 
with disabilities with a FAPE or any other standard of education.125  On the 
other hand, LEAs are required to provide services to students with disabilities 
in private schools to some extent.  LEAs are responsible for finding, evaluat-
ing, and offering services to all children with disabilities in their enrollment 
district126 and for providing services to children with special needs who are 
enrolled in private schools, provided that the expenditure not benefit the 
school as a whole or the general education population of the private school.127 
III.  INTERACTION OF THE IDEA WITH SCHOOL CHOICE 
In any system dominated by private and charter-school options, students 
with disabilities, particularly disabilities that require more intensive school 
resources such as autism and intellectual disabilities, will have inadequate 
opportunities to be educated in their LRE.  Both charter schools and private 
schools accept a lower share of students with special needs than are served in 
public schools.128  Skimming—which we see happening in charter schools 
despite current federal mandates and which is entirely legal in private 
schools—is already restricting the choices of students with disabilities, deny-
ing them equal opportunities.129  Current remedies are inadequate to confront 
the problem.  The only way to address a failure to place a student in their 
LRE is to order a school district to place a student appropriately in a more 
mainstreamed environment—something that can only happen if there is ap-
propriate placement available.  As it stands, too few choice schools offer stu-
dents with disabilities appropriate placements. 
                                                          
the local educational agency will not be able to establish and maintain programs of suf-
ficient size and scope to effectively meet the needs of children with disabilities. 
Id. § 1413(e)(1)(A).  The charter school exception states: “A State educational agency may not 
require a charter school that is a local educational agency to jointly establish its eligibility under 
subparagraph (A) unless the charter school is explicitly permitted to do so under the State’s charter 
school law.”  Id. § 1413(e)(1)(B); see also Garda, supra note 60, at 671–72 (citing Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 613(e)(2), 111 Stat. 37, 76 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1413(e)(1)(B) (2006))). 
 125.  E.g., Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. R.M.M., 861 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2017).  
 126.  34 C.F.R. § 300.131 (2018).  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: PROVISIONS RELATED TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
ENROLLED BY THEIR PARENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/ad-
mins/lead/speced/privateschools/idea.pdf.  
 127.  34 C.F.R. § 300.141. 
 128.  See infra notes 129–133 and accompanying text. 
 129.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 492 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:470 
A.  Charter Schools’ Limitations for Students with Disabilities 
Enrollment statistics indicate that charter schools underserve the popu-
lation of students with special needs.130  As a whole, students with disabilities 
make up a smaller percentage of total students in charter schools than they 
do in public schools.131  A study, commissioned by a charter-school network, 
found that in New York “[t]he average rate of enrollment of students with 
disabilities in charter schools (14.3[%]) falls below the average enrollment 
rate in the district-run schools (18.2[%]).”132  Similar discrepancies have been 
found in other localities.133  Moreover, a disproportionate number of students 
with disabilities who attend charter schools enroll in specialty charter schools 
with high numbers of students with special needs.134  This likely indicates 
that the charter school population is even more segregated with regards to 
students with disabilities than the overall enrollment numbers indicate be-
cause overall enrollment averages do not account for segregation of students 
with disabilities into specialty charter schools. 
Charter schools face practical barriers to fully serving students with dis-
abilities, especially students whose disabilities require costly support.  As 
Professor Robert Garda, Jr. notes, “[The IDEA] presumed the existence of a 
district with a bureaucracy of sufficient size to handle burdensome procedural 
requirements and to capitalize on economies of scale for service provision to 
                                                          
 130.  AHEARN ET AL., supra note 58, at 4–5; see also Garda, supra note 60, at 681–83 (citing 
private and government findings showing that charter schools serve lower proportions of students 
with special needs than public schools at both the national and state levels). 
 131.  The United States Government Accountability Office examined enrollment of students 
with special needs in all U.S. charter schools in the 2009 to 2010 school year.  It found that 8.2% of 
students in charter schools identified special needs, while 11.3% of the total public-school popula-
tion identified special needs.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 120, at 6–7.  Of 
the entire school-age population, 11.2% identified special needs.  Id. 
 132.  LAKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 4. 
 133.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 16, at 1385; Robert Garda, Searching for Equity amid a System 
of Schools: The View from New Orleans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 647 (2015) (“In 2010, charter 
schools educated sixty percent of the public school students in New Orleans, but enrolled only 
thirty-eight percent of the students with autism, thirty-seven percent of the students with severe 
emotional disturbances, and twenty-three percent of the students with multiple disabilities.”). 
 134.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 120, at 8–9 (“We also found that, rela-
tive to traditional public schools, the proportion of charter schools that enrolled high percentages of 
students with disabilities was lower overall and generally tapered off the greater the enrollment of 
students with disabilities.  Specifically, the enrollment of students with disabilities was [eight] to 
[twelve] percent at [twenty-three] percent of charter schools and [thirty-four] percent of traditional 
public schools.  Further, when the enrollment of students with disabilities reached [twelve] to [six-
teen] percent, about [thirteen] percent of charter schools compared to [twenty-five] percent of tra-
ditional public schools had these enrollment levels.  However, when compared to traditional public 
schools, a higher percentage of charter schools enrolled more than [twenty] percent of students with 
disabilities.  During an interview with Education, an official noted that there has been an increase 
in charter schools for students with disabilities, such as schools for students with autism, for exam-
ple, which may help explain this difference.”). 
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disabled students.”135  Public school districts are able to pool and disburse 
resources, while “the limited resources and lack of economies of scale are 
particularly problematic for public charter schools.”136  The Government Ac-
countability Office concurs: “Anecdotal accounts . . . suggest that some char-
ter schools may be discouraging students with disabilities from enrolling and 
denying admission to students with more severe disabilities because services 
are too costly.”137 
Charter and other choice schools are also discouraged from enrolling 
students with disabilities because the primary mechanism by which schools 
are evaluated is through standardized test scores, and test scores for students 
with disabilities tend to be lower than those of general education students.138  
Test scores vary between students, and the average test scores for students 
diagnosed with some disabilities, like speech and language disorders, are 
higher than those of students diagnosed with other disabilities, like intellec-
tual disabilities, giving charter and other choice schools further incentive to 
educate only students who present as having disabilities that require fewer 
resources than other students.139 
Given these realities, it is perhaps not surprising that charter schools 
underserve students with disabilities.  They reduce their special education 
populations in several ways.  For example, it is not uncommon for charter 
schools to “counsel out” students with disabilities, particularly disabilities 
requiring more intensive services, by advising them that their needs would 
                                                          
 135.  Garda, supra note 60, at 670. 
 136.  PAUL T. O’NEILL & LAUREN MORANDO RHIM, EQUITY AT SCALE: HOW PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOL NETWORKS CAN INNOVATE AND IMPROVE SERVICES FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES 4–5 (2015), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52feb326e4b069fc72abb0c8/t/54d4f576e4b0fafca6766ce8/1
423242614524/equity_at_scale_011215.pdf (“Whereas a district may employ a variety of special-
ists and instructional and support staff at the school and district levels, an independent public charter 
school is likely to have to make do with a single special education coordinator and a handful of 
special education teachers.”).  
 137.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 120, at 12. 
 138.  See, e.g., Garda, supra note 133, at 647 (“Accountability requirements create strong incen-
tives to deny admission to . . . lower performing students.”).  Being a teacher and administrator at a 
private school serving low-income students made clear to me the importance of test scores even for 
independently funded schools.  Foundations and donors look to test scores, as do parents, to formally 
and informally evaluate schools.  
 139.  See Ellen L. Trexler, Categorical Differences in Statewide Standardized Testing Scores of 
Students with Disabilities 67–69 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Keiser University) 
(demonstrating differences in average standardized test scores across disability categories); Chris-
tian P. Wilkens, Students with Disabilities in Urban Massachusetts Charter Schools: Access, Inclu-
sion, and Policy 12–15 (2009) (unpublished Ed.D. thesis, Harvard University) (noting significant 
differences in enrollment in charter schools across disability categories). 
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be better met elsewhere.140  Charter schools can also actively shape their ap-
plicant pools through their marketing, their curricular focus, and their capac-
ity to meet the needs of students with special needs.141  If the school does not 
offer classes and resources that students need, parents are less likely to enroll 
their children in the school in the first place.  Charter, magnet, and other 
schools in choice systems also sometimes prefer students who paid tuition in 
previous years, children who live in specific neighborhoods, and children 
who qualify through test scores or other selective processes, among other 
preferences.142 
Being underserved has concrete consequences for students with disabil-
ities.  The Southern Poverty Law Center conducted an analysis of the New 
Orleans RSD, a fully choice school district, and found:  
• Only 6.8% of RSD students with disabilities exit with a 
high school diploma, while across the state, the average 
is 19.4%.   
• In the 2008–09 school year, RSD schools suspended 
nearly 30% of all students with disabilities—a rate that 
is 63% higher than the state average. . . . 
• On average, school districts throughout Louisiana have 
identified 12.2% of their students as eligible for special 
education services.  New Orleans Public Schools have 
identified only 8% of their students as eligible for special 
education services.  Comparable school districts 
throughout the country identify almost twice as many 
students with disabilities.143 
One woman in Louisiana described trying to obtain an appropriate edu-
cation for her son in the New Orleans RSD: 
                                                          
 140.  See, e.g., Garda, supra note 60, at 686–87 (citing reports and lawsuits across numerous 
states); Garda, supra note 133, at 639–43 (describing the impact of retention policies on students in 
New Orleans).  
 141.  Black, supra note 16, at 1383–84.  
 142.  See, e.g., Garda, supra note 133, at 634–37 (describing selective admission processes that 
continue to exist in New Orleans even after the process was simplified); W. David Stevens et al., 
Barriers to Access: High School Choice Process and Outcomes in Chicago, in SCHOOL CHOICE 
AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT 125, 125–33 (Mark Berends et al. eds., 2011) (discussing ways that 
parents’ choices for schooling were limited in Chicago).  
 143.  SHAKTI BELWAY, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., ACCESS DENIED: NEW ORLEANS STUDENTS 
AND PARENTS IDENTIFY BARRIERS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION 10 (2010), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publica-
tion/SPLC_report_Access_Denied.pdf (footnotes omitted); see also Garda, supra note 133, at 646 
(“[Charter schools] have long been blamed for denying admission to students with disabilities, 
‘cherry-picking’ students with mild disabilities, providing a one-size-fits-all program instead of a 
full continuum of placements, failing to follow proper disciplinary procedures, and failing to iden-
tify students as disabled.  These accusations are particularly strong in New Orleans.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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The [RSD] told us about specific schools that would be appropriate 
for our son but when we tried to enroll him, they were already full. 
 . . . . 
 I’ve gone to eight different charter schools.  Of those schools, 
five said they would take my application but could not accommo-
date my son with disabilities.  Another said they would work with 
him but were stretched pretty thin. 
 Most charters said they don’t have the staffing, training or mate-
rials.  One woman literally said, “I don’t think we’re hurting kids 
with special needs but I know we’re not helping them.  You don’t 
want your son to go here.”144 
Other parents, whose seventeen-year-old son had an IEP for autism, de-
scribed their son’s experience in a charter school: 
One of the things the school principal made known to us was they 
were going to treat him just like a regular kid.  They were not going 
to treat him like a special education student.  They said they would 
call the police on our son for anything he does wrong.  And they 
actually did call.  And, it just went downhill after that. 
 . . . . 
 After all of this has gone on, we’re very reluctant to let him stay 
in school.  He’s gotten to the point where he doesn’t want to stay 
and we don’t want him to be there, so we’ll just let him transition 
out and get him into something else, into a vocation.145 
State funding mechanisms tend to assume that the distribution of spe-
cial-education students in charter schools and in district schools is equivalent, 
resulting in over funding of charter schools.146  Some states, like Massachu-
setts, distribute funds to charter schools based on the average cost of educat-
ing all students in a district.147  This results in charter schools receiving equal 
funds to educate relatively fewer students with high-cost educational needs.  
Other states, like Pennsylvania, provide additional funds for students who 
have IEPs, but those additional funds are also based on averages—the aver-
age cost to the sending school district for educating a child with disabili-
ties.148  The cost of special education varies widely across disabilities and 
between individual students.  Reimbursement for special-education students 
                                                          
 144.  BELWAY, supra note 143, at 12. 
 145.  Id. at 13. 
 146.  See, e.g., Wilkens, supra note 139, at 18–19. 
 147.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89(ff) (West 2018); Wilkens, supra note 139, at 20. 
 148.  24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1725-A (West 2016). 
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can be several times that of reimbursement for general-education students.149  
On the other hand, some students with disabilities require relatively low-cost 
services, while others require very-high cost services, including dedicated 
paraprofessionals.150  Some charter-school funding, like Massachusetts’s and 
Pennsylvania’s, is based on averages without concurrent requirements for 
provision of services proportional to those provided by traditional public 
schools.151  As a result, charter schools are financially incentivized to enroll 
students who have IEPs but whose needs can be met at relatively low-cost, 
and disincentivized to serve students with higher-cost disabilities.152 
B.  Private Schools 
Private and parochial schools occupy a curious intersection with the 
IDEA.  In all but one scenario, private and parochial schools are not account-
able for implementing any provisions of the IDEA.153  Nonetheless, private 
and parochial schools may provide, and be reimbursed by the state for, ser-
vices for students with disabilities.154 
There are several routes by which students with disabilities may attend 
private or parochial schools with some or all of their educational costs paid 
for by the state.  One option is for parents to place their children in a private 
or parochial school at their own expense.  In that situation, the LEA in which 
a private school is located is responsible for identifying, evaluating, and, to 
some extent, funding appropriate services to students with disabilities.155  The 
LEA may not pay for any instruction above and beyond the direct needs of 
the student, however, and the funding may not go towards any administrative 
costs or the instruction of general education students in the private or paro-
chial school.156  Another route by which students may attend private school 
with funding from the state is for a parent to show, through an administrative 
process, that the LEA responsible for their child has not provided a FAPE.  
In that case, the LEA can agree or be ordered to pay tuition to an appropriate 
private school for the school year during which the LEA did not provide the 
                                                          
 149.  Black, supra note 16, at 1371–72 (“Consider Morrisville Borough, for instance, where the 
reimbursement for regular education students was $11,000 per pupil and $42,642 for special edu-
cation students.” (citing Charter School Funding: 2016–2017 Tuition Rates, PENN. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter%20Schools/Pages/Charter-School-Fund-
ing.aspx#tab-1 (last visited Oct. 18, 2017))). 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  See id.; supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text. 
 152.  Black, supra note 16, at 1370–72.  
 153.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (2012). 
 154.  34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130–300.148 (2018).  
 155.  Id. § 300.131. 
 156.  Id. § 300.141. 
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FAPE to which the child was entitled.157  To obtain funding, a parent must 
show that the private school can provide an appropriate education, but it need 
not be in the child’s LRE.158  Finally, in some states, parents can place their 
children in private or parochial schools using vouchers or state-sponsored 
scholarships, such as Florida’s McKay Scholarship.  Parents who enroll their 
children in private or parochial schools in this way lose the rights they would 
otherwise have under the IDEA, just as they would if they were paying the 
full tuition themselves.159  In only one situation do parents retain the full sub-
stantive and procedural rights provided by the IDEA: when LEAs, in agree-
ment with the child’s parent, directly place students in private school pursu-
ant to the child’s IEP.  In that case, and in that case only, the private school, 
in connection with the LEA, has an obligation to comply with the IDEA.160 
Private schools are not required to accept all students.161  Though they 
must abide by the requirements of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act, they are responsible only for providing accommodations that 
would not be an “undue burden” on the school and that would not “funda-
mentally alter” the nature of its services.162  Private schools are free to estab-
lish their own admission criteria absent discrimination on the basis of race, 
                                                          
 157.  20 U.S.C. § 1412; 34 C.F.R. § 300.148; Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 
(2009); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
 158.  34 C.F.R. § 300.148; Florence, 510 U.S. at 13–15. 
 159.  See McKay Scholarship Program FAQs, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/k-12-scholarship-programs/mckay/mckay-faqs.stml 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (“A public school district’s obligations to a student with disabilities 
placed in a private school by his or her parents are different from its responsibilities to a student 
enrolled in public school.  When a student with a disability withdraws from public school, the dis-
trict is no longer obligated to provide all of the services contained in the student’s IEP.  Districts are 
required to spend a proportionate amount of IDEA federal funds to provide equitable services to 
private school students; however, the amount and type of services may differ from the services the 
student would receive if placed in a public school by the parents.  The procedural safeguards for 
parents of public-school students under IDEA are not in effect for parents of students in private 
schools (with the exception of child find), including those private schools participating in state 
scholarship programs.  Parents of scholarship students are encouraged to take care to choose a pri-
vate school that provides the curriculum, services, and educational approach that will meet the needs 
of their students.”); see also IND. CODE § 20-51-4-4.5 (2016) (authorizing the transfer of special 
education funds to private schools for choice scholarship recipients eligible for special education); 
511 IND. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 7-34-6 (LexisNexis 2014) (stating that due process procedures are not 
available for disputes regarding FAPE when parents place their children in private schools).  
 160.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B); see also A.C. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 191 F. Supp. 3d 375, 390 
(M.D. Pa. 2016) (“Thus, since [Scranton School District (“SSD”)] placed, at its expense, A.C. in 
New Story, a private facility allegedly contracted by SSD to provide education to district students, 
plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that New Story was subject to the same statutory standard for 
providing A.C. a FAPE as SSD.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Dollars to Discriminate: The (Un)intended Conse-
quences of School Vouchers, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 537 (2016) (reviewing state voucher laws for 
nondiscrimination provisions and finding few).  
 162.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“[D]iscrimination includes . . . a failure to make rea-
sonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary 
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color, or national origin.163  Many schools that utilize public funds through 
vouchers openly discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer students.164  Parents who want to participate in state voucher programs 
must obtain admission for their child to the private school, just as anyone else 
would.165  If a private school can plausibly say that providing an appropriate 
education to a student with a disability would be an “undue burden” or “fun-
damentally alter” the nature of its services, federal law does not require that 
school to accept the student, even if the school receives some public fund-
ing.166 
In voucher programs, oversight of private and parochial schools is min-
imal.  In 2017, the Orlando Sentinel published a comprehensive three-part 
investigative report detailing problems resulting from the lack of oversight 
of private schools participating in Florida voucher programs, including nu-
merous cases of private schools providing inadequate educational services 
under dubious circumstances.167  Florida law expressly states, “It is the intent 
of the Legislature not to regulate, control, approve, or accredit private educa-
tional institutions.”168  The accountability requirements for private schools 
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participating in the Florida McKay voucher program are minimal, consisting 
of an annual “written explanation of the student’s progress” and cooperation 
with state assessment should the parent wish.169  Oversight of private-school 
voucher programs is similarly limited in other states as well.170  The voucher 
program can also offer perverse incentives to public schools, which can en-
courage parents of students who are expensive to educate, and who may not 
score well on standardized tests, to use the scholarship to attend a private 
school.171 
IV.  COMPETING INTERESTS 
A.  Right of Individual Choice vs. Obligation for Equal Protection 
The Supreme Court has made clear that parents have the right to choose 
to educate their children in private and religious settings rather than public 
schools.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court stated: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in 
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from pub-
lic teachers only.  The child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, cou-
pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.172 
However, all states have an obligation under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to provide equal 
opportunity to all students.173  This obligation is clearly articulated by the 
original Brown v. Board of Education decision174 and following desegrega-
tion orders; the Virginia state and federal decisions preventing Virginia from 
shutting down some school districts if others in the state remained open;175 
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 171.  Gus Garcia-Roberts, McKay Scholarship Program Sparks a Cottage Industry of Fraud and 
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and in special education decisions Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Children v. Pennsylvania176 and Mills v. Board of Education.177 
When Americans talk about school choice today, it is usually described 
using Friedman’s language of competition.178  There is, however, another 
motive driving many proponents of choice: religious separation.  A desire for 
separation drives religious conservatives like Betsy DeVos, the current Sec-
retary of Education under President Donald Trump.179  Significant Christian 
leaders and organizations have called on parents to take their children out of 
public schools, and home schooling and Christian education is increasing.180  
In Indiana, more parents cite a desire for a more religious environment as 
their reason for using the voucher program to send their children to private 
school than any other reason, including academic reasons.181 
At the same time, teachers and officials in Indiana express growing con-
cern about the decreased funding for public schools due to vouchers.182  
There is a vast difference between allowing parents to enroll their children in 
parochial schools, on the one hand, and using public funds to support paro-
chial schooling to the detriment of the goal of equal protection, including an 
appropriate education in the LRE for students with disabilities, on the other.  
Recently, “[w]hen pollsters [for EdNext] asked survey participants whether 
they supported ‘government funds’ being used for private school tuition—
versus giving families ‘wider choice’—vouchers received less support.”183 
In many ways, the divide over Milwaukee’s voucher program mirrors 
the current conundrum about school vouchers.184  On one hand, proponents, 
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such as Professor Howard Fuller, founder of the Black Alliance for Educa-
tional Options, argue, “[M]ost of Milwaukee’s African-American students 
are trapped in failing schools.  These kids’ parents, says Fuller, should have 
the right to choose a better school for their children because very little else 
that the African-American community has fought for has helped rescue poor 
black children in need of good schools.”185   
Wendell Harris, on the other hand, was one of the original National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) plaintiffs who 
sued the state of Wisconsin in 1990 to try to stop the voucher program.186  
Today, as a member of the Milwaukee School Board, he notes that private 
and parochial schools are not required to accept students with special needs 
and are not required to disclose suspension and expulsion rates.  Of that, he 
says, “[P]rivate and public schools don’t play by the same rules.  The issue 
of public money with no oversight, I have a problem with that.”187 
School choice programs tend to lead to greater segregation in many re-
spects.  Mentioned above is religious separation, and this Article focuses on 
the limiting of integration of students with disabilities, but it is important to 
note that even when it is arguably not a deliberate goal, school choice tends 
to lead to increased racial segregation.  This can be seen quite starkly in Min-
nesota, for example.  In 1972, the United States District Court for the District 
of Minnesota ordered segregated Minneapolis to desegregate,188 and by 1999, 
there were nine segregated elementary schools in the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
metro area.189  In a dramatic reversal, as of 2008, there were forty-five.190 
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The increase in segregated schools coincided neatly with the increase of char-
ter schools, which serve primarily minority students in Minneapolis.191  In 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, charter schools are often designed to target a spe-
cific minority group, such as the Hmong International Academy and the Af-
rocentric Education Academy.192  Charter schools have been explicitly pro-
moted by the Federal Department of Education since 2009,193 and segregated 
charter schools are increasingly common throughout the country.194  Parents 
of all races prefer schools in which their children would not be a minority.195  
White parents, in particular, are reluctant to send their children to schools 
with large numbers of black children and use race as a proxy for determining 
quality.196 
B.  Maximizing Individual Achievement of Some Children Does Not 
Adequately Serve the Public Policy Goal of Educating All Children 
An educated public is important for a functioning society and economy.  
As jobs require increasingly greater levels of knowledge and skills, all coun-
tries have a need for their citizens to have some significant level of education 
to continue economic growth.197  All state constitutions require the state to 
provide a baseline standard of education to all children, though that baseline 
varies from state to state.198 
Even as Friedman advocated for parental choice in education in a soci-
ety that values individual freedom as its “ultimate objective,” Friedman rec-
ognized that “[a] stable and democratic society is impossible without wide-
spread acceptance of some common set of values and without a minimum 
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degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens.”199  So, while 
Friedman idealized a system in which all parents would be able to select ed-
ucational options freely in a free market, Friedman also acknowledged that 
education is not merely a private good but a public necessity.200  As laid out 
in Part II, federal law codifies the importance of educating children with dis-
abilities. 
Children with special needs generally make greater educational gains in 
inclusive settings than in classrooms segregated by ability.201  These gains 
are important for students with disabilities to prepare for independence and 
employment.  Overall, there is also a modest positive impact on general ed-
ucation students, both educationally and socially, when special education stu-
dents are included in their general education classrooms.202 
Many individual students win in school choice.  There are countless sto-
ries of individual lives bettered by charter schools and by access to private 
schools through vouchers or scholarships.  Advocates for charter schools reg-
ularly tell these stories, like that of Troy Simon, a New Orleans native who 
credits a charter school with turning his life around and enabling him to move 
from near illiteracy to becoming a student at Yale Divinity School.203  These 
stories abound, not just about low-income or minority students generally, but 
also about students with disabilities, as can be seen in states like Florida, 
which has a disability-specific voucher/scholarship program.204 
However, many individual students lose in school choice.  Students who 
have disabilities often lose, as laid out in Part III.  Parents of students with 
disabilities often have trouble locating appropriate schools for their children.  
After enrolling their children in private schools that seem to offer appropriate 
services, parents find out too late that their children are not receiving ade-
quate services.  At that point, there is less recourse to remedies than there 
would be in public schools under the IDEA.205  Even the adamantly pro-
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school-choice Manhattan Institute reported that a significant number of par-
ents of recipients of Florida’s McKay Scholarship for students with disabili-
ties had difficulty finding an “acceptable school” for their children.206 
Choice also tends to reward families with high levels of information, 
social connections, and money—these families have greater access to the in-
dividual benefits choice can offer—while lower income families with less 
information find themselves with fewer choices.  In voucher systems without 
significant income restrictions, wealthy parents can pay the difference be-
tween the value of a voucher and the cost of tuition, a difference that is some-
times substantial.207  Distance, availability of transportation, and siblings’ 
schools all impact actual availability of choices.208  In choice systems, parents 
tend to choose what is familiar over what is unfamiliar and rely on their social 
networks to choose schools.209  As a result, low-income children tend to 
choose schools where large numbers of students are from low-income back-
grounds.210  Segregation by class is sometimes more dramatic than segrega-
tion by race in school systems that feature some version of parental choice.211  
As Professor Osamudia R. James points out: 
[I]f we acknowledge, as we must, that the drivers of underachieve-
ment in schools are concentrated poverty and isolation of students 
by race and class, then charters do little more then give parents 
more say in socially, politically, and fiscally vulnerable schools, at 
the expense of the democratic and anti-subordination values that 
integrated schools impart.212 
Most parents across socio-economic and racial spectrums prefer neigh-
borhood schools that provide positive educations for their children.  But that 
is not always available to less wealthy families, particularly in urban areas.213  
When choice leaves many students without adequate options, substituting 
choice for acceptable local public schools actually leaves too many parents 
without any true choices. 
                                                          
 206.  GREENE & FORSTER, supra note 18, at 11. 
 207.  Annie Waldman, Voucher Program Helps Well-Off Vermonters Pay for Prep School at 
Public Expense, PROPUBLICA (June 2, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/voucher-program-
helps-well-off-vermonters-pay-prep-school-at-public-expense?utm_ 
campaign=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&utm_content=1496408041. 
 208.  James, supra note 16, at 1103 n.91. 
 209.  DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 18. 
 210.  Id. at 18, 32–33; see also Stevens et al., supra note 142, at 125–45. 
 211.  The introduction of magnet schools, an early version of school choice used by some cities 
to reduce racial segregation, led quickly to greater class segregation even as racial segregation de-
creased.  Carmel McCoubrey, Magnet Schools and Class, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/23/us/notebook-magnet-schools-and-class.html?emc=eta1. 
 212.  James, supra note 16, at 1117 (footnote omitted). 
 213.  Anna Rhodes & Siri Warkentien, Unwrapping the Suburban “Package Deal”: Race, 
Class, and School Access, 54 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 168S, 169S (2017). 
 2019] LIMITED CHOICES 505 
Even when choice programs begin by specifically targeting underserved 
populations, they may expand to benefit primarily those who would already 
be in private school.  In Indiana, the state voucher program began by requir-
ing that recipients attend at least a year in public school.  Former Indiana 
governor, now United States Vice President, Mike Pence pushed successfully 
to change that policy, and now more than half of Indiana voucher recipients 
have never attended public school.214  The Indiana voucher program’s in-
come restrictions, which initially prioritized low-income students, were also 
loosened, allowing middle class families to qualify.215 
Not only does school choice leave many students with unequal or inad-
equate educational options, it does not improve education as a whole.  Data 
on school choice make clear that student achievement, as measured by stand-
ardized test scores, does not reliably improve when parents have greater 
choice in the schools their children attend.  Data from Indiana and Louisiana, 
two of the largest school-choice projects, show that “public school students 
that received vouchers to attend private schools scored lower compared to 
similar students who did not attend private schools.”216  Stanford education 
professor Martin Carnoy reviewed two decades of data on the impacts of 
vouchers, and concluded that vouchers do not improve educational achieve-
ment for either students who receive them or students in school districts af-
fected by voucher competition.217  A longitudinal study of students in private 
and public schools found that any advantage private school students had over 
public school students was completely eliminated when the study’s authors 
controlled for socioeconomic factors.218  Data on charter schools is similarly 
uninspiring, with more charter schools underperforming on test scores than 
over performing as compared to the local district public schools.219  The sin-
gle measure by which choice schools consistently perform well is in parental 
satisfaction.220  Several decades in, it is clear that school choice is not a cure 
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for educational problems, and while many parents are happy with their access 
to choice, many other parents are left without adequate choice in choice sys-
tems, perpetuating and even increasing inequality, particularly for students 
with disabilities. 
V.  SCHOOL CHOICE LEGISLATION SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY CONSISTENT 
WITH THE IDEA, THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, AND CLEARLY 
ARTICULATED PUBLIC POLICY GOALS FOR INTEGRATION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION 
A.  The Role of Advocates 
As The Wall Street Journal reported in 2011, “school choice is now here 
to stay.”221  For many years, advocates against vouchers argued that voucher 
programs funding religious schools violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution.  That argument cannot now be used to 
constrain voucher programs.222  In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris223 and then in 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer,224 the Supreme Court made 
clear that religious schools could participate in federally funded programs.225  
Private schools, including parochial schools, can accept public payment for 
tuition through vouchers and through other payment schemes, and can di-
rectly accept government funds.226 
Advocates against charter schools have challenged the legitimacy of 
funding charter schools under state laws and constitutions, but charter school 
development continues.227  In Washington, teachers’ unions and other groups 
challenged state laws regarding charter schools, obtaining a state supreme 
court verdict that charter schools did not qualify as “common schools” and 
could not be funded using state general funds.228  The state legislature 
promptly rewrote the law to fund charter schools from lottery proceeds.229  
Across the country, a school district in New Jersey challenged state approval 
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of a charter school expansion, arguing that it depleted the funding for the 
school districts’ own students while educating large numbers of students 
from neighboring school districts.230  The Appellate Division  of the Superior 
Court of New Jersey denied the claim, holding that the court had only limited 
authority to review state administrative decisions and that the approval was 
within the bounds of state charter law.231 
Despite the courts’ reluctance to limit expansion of school choice pro-
grams, advocates can take action to hold states responsible for providing 
equal access to education as those programs are considered or implemented.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that, under the Equal Protection Clause, 
all states must provide equal access to the baseline education they provide to 
any group of students.232  Equal access does not necessarily mean equal edu-
cation.  As a country, we have more or less accepted that inequality exists.233  
With respect to racial segregation, the Supreme Court has declined to recog-
nize a role for the courts in limiting de facto segregation, instead limiting 
desegregation and monitoring orders to districts with at least de jure segrega-
tion.234  Under the IDEA, school districts are required only to develop pro-
grams designed for students to make “meaningful progress,” not necessarily 
maximize each student’s progress.235  Still, despite limitations, the Constitu-
tion demands a baseline standard of equality,236 as do state constitutions,237 
and the IDEA provides a floor for adequate education and mainstreaming.238  
Consistently articulated public policy interests demand this as well.239 
Students with disabilities are uniquely situated in that they have a clear 
statutory right in every state to a certain level of education and to education 
in a type of setting: the least restrictive setting.240  School-choice programs 
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cannot operate in a way that impedes equal access to education for students 
with disabilities.  Disrupting the rights specified in the IDEA for some stu-
dents by not offering adequate placement options that are subject to and ad-
here with the standards of the IDEA significantly impedes the right to equal 
access. 
Students who do not have identified disabilities can also be harmed 
when school choice envelops a school district.241  The problems of students 
with disabilities, who have identifiable rights and accessible remedies though 
the IDEA, are, in some ways, the canaries in the coal mine warning of the 
dangers of choosing school choice policies over local public education.  
While students with disabilities have statutory protections, and the Constitu-
tion does not provide an explicit right to education, states that offer public 
education must provide equal access to the baseline education they provide 
to any group of students, as noted above.  To the greatest extent possible, 
advocates should also look to protections offered by state constitutions to 
protect all students.242 
B.  Legislative Suggestions 
Although schools receiving federal funds are obligated to follow laws 
regarding discrimination, affirmative policies to promote equal access are 
also necessary.  Restrictions on federal funds should be designed to remove 
incentives for school-choice programs to disadvantage students with disabil-
ities and privilege middle and upper-middle class families who would send 
their general-education children to private or religious schools regardless of 
vouchers.  Advocates should push for legislation and regulations that proac-
tively protect vulnerable populations by putting affirmative obligations on all 
schools that accept public funds.  Changes should be made at the federal and 
state levels to ensure that all schools receiving government funding—includ-
ing charter, private and parochial schools—must comply with the IDEA and 
its legislative embodiment of the principals of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There is currently no federal requirement for states to promulgate regu-
lations holding private schools accountable for providing procedural protec-
tions to students with disabilities.243  One option is for the federal government 
to change the standards under the IDEA to encompass private schools edu-
cating students with disabilities using federal funds.  States could also do the 
same without federal action.  Nothing in federal law prohibits states from 
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requiring all schools to meet the requirements of the IDEA should they accept 
students with state funding related to the IDEA.  Some states, such as New 
Jersey, have already done so.244 
Another change to consider would be to require schools receiving fed-
eral funds under the IDEA, voucher, or other funding schemes to address 
their LEA status.  Right now, the onus of responsibility generally falls on the 
public-school district where a student lives or where the choice school is lo-
cated.245  In those states that allow charter schools to be their own LEA, the 
charter schools almost always lack sufficient resources to appropriately serve 
all comers, as discussed in Section III.A.  Instead, Congress should promote 
coordinated pooling of resources and responsibility within communities and 
within charter schools or private-school systems (such as KIPP and Catholic 
dioceses). 
Moreover, legislative changes should take into account the perverse in-
centives of increased standardized testing noted in Section III.A.  School 
evaluations should become more holistic and less narrowly focused on stand-
ardized testing.  Jack Schneider, an Assistant Professor of Education at Col-
lege of the Holy Cross and Director of Research for the Massachusetts Con-
sortium for Innovative Education Assessment, developed a model in 
Massachusetts that could serve as a foundation for those who wish to hold 
schools accountable but understand that standardized testing fails to do so.246 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
School choice can be beneficial to many individual children.  Most peo-
ple placing their children in choice schools, running choice schools, or teach-
ing within them, are acting in reasonable, rational, and sympathetic ways.  
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That being said, school choice has not proven to be a panacea for troubles 
facing public school systems in this country.  Moreover, implementing sys-
tem-wide choice programs leads to troubling questions of access and, indeed, 
limited choices.  We cannot ignore that increasing school choice makes stu-
dents with disabilities more vulnerable.  As a country, we have reached a 
consensus that students with disabilities are entitled to an appropriate educa-
tion in public schools with general-education students to the greatest extent 
possible.  Detailed regulations, however imperfect, have been instrumental 
in making that goal realistic for students with disabilities.  Unchecked school 
choice threatens to undermine the ability of children with disabilities to re-
ceive that appropriate education.  Since, as a country, we have decided to go 
down the path of choice, we must amend our legislation to actively protect 
the most vulnerable students.  Even without amended legislation, attorneys 
should litigate to protect the rights of students with disabilities in federal and 
state courts based on the principle of equal protection under the law. 
